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COMMENTAIRES 
Wage Comparisons and Productivity 
E.F. BEACH 
In thèse days of rising priées and wages, the use of guide lines is in-
évitable. They may be imposed by governments or they may be used to test 
relative progress. In either case it is important to know what can and what 
cannot be expected of the data available. Officiai séries on wages and sala-
ries paid, for example, are weighted averages, and hâve ail the weaknesses 
of such averages. 
It is well known that a weighted average can change because of a 
change in weights, without any change in the éléments weighted. Demogra-
phers hâve learned to stabilize weights so as to measure net reproduction 
rates. Students of index numbers hâve long wrestled with the problem, and 
hâve found no simple solution. Professor Marion <J) has made an interesting 
contribution in the field of wage comparisons, but in not pursuing the 
analysis far enough, he leaves some misimpressions. 
Consider a group of labourers, ail doing the same kind of work, and 
ail getting the same rate of pay. Each rate is then identical with the average. 
As new men are added, and old men retired, the members of the group 
change, but this has not effect on the wage rates. They ail rise or fall to-
gether. 
Consider now, a second group, such as Professor Marion pictures, in 
which there is a regular progression toward the top jobs. The total number 
of employées, and the relative numbers in the sub-groups, remain un-
changed. The retirement of one person is offset by a new hiring plus a num-
ber of shiftings up the ladder. It may be noted that each employée appears 
to enjoy an increase in salary greater than the average, which is unchanged. 
The retired worker is no longer counted in the group of employées, and no 
account is taken of pension payments. Of course, the salaries could include 
ail fringe benefits. 
Statistical theory teaches us that it is impossible for ail members of a 
group to be greater than the average of that group, <2> and a little reflection 
0) Gerald MARION, « Relations entre les augmentations statutaires et les redressements 
généraux de salaires». Relations Industrielles Vol. 23 (1968) No. I, pp. 109-122. 
(2) But see below for a discussion of weighted averages. This rule applies to un-
weighted averages, and to averages with fixed weights. 
196 RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 24, NO 1 
shows that there are indeed two différent distributions. The average wage 
is constant from one period to the next because the numbers are the same 
at the two dates. But in considering changes for individuals, the proper 
distribution is the group of ail changes that hâve occurred between the two 
dates, including the new hirings and the retirements. Those who hâve 
retired hâve had a total loss of employment income, and their losses offset 
the gains of ail the others. This is a negatively skewed distribution, with a 
few large losses offset by many more gains of smaller amounts. In this 
spécial case the average of the changes is zéro, <s> and so also is the change 
in the average ; but they are two différent things. 
In any actual group of employées, a comparison of two dates will 
show some new hirings, some retirements, some promotions, perhaps some 
shifting to différent jobs, and the rest unchanged in their jobs. Some jobs 
will hâve their rates changed, and others, perhaps not. To measure the 
gênerai average change under thèse circumstances is a statistical problem 
of considérable magnitude. Some people feel that no gênerai comparisons 
are possible. The real problem is that many comparisons are possible, some 
of which are ridiculous, absurd, or misleading, and others which may be 
quite good indeed. 
The purpose of the comparison should be defined. If the situation is 
one at a bargaining table, and the question to be settled in the first instance 
is the amount or rate of increase there has been in the group, the problem 
then is to find a suitable measure of the change in the average. Two sets 
of weights could be used to compute two kinds of weighted average, one 
using the weights as of the beginning, and the other with the weights as at 
the end of the period. Thèse will, in gênerai, resuit in two limits within 
which an agreement may be hoped for by some method of averaging the 
two averages. Or it may be agreed that certain key groups are to be used 
as a basis for the comparison. 
A différent kind of purpose is to show « what happened > over an 
extended period. Several séries could then be computed under différent as-
sumptions, and their implications analyzed. The weights should be exa-
mined — that is, the numbers in the various catégories. If there has been 
no appréciable change in thèse weights, good answers may be obtained, at 
least for a part of the whole period. In order to test the effect of changes 
in weights that hâve taken place, various computations could be made. If 
data on the weights are inadéquate, inferences may be drawn from related 
data. In gênerai it can be expected that there will be a graduai shift in the 
weights from the lower paid occupations to the higher paid occupations, in 
broad industrial groups, over longer periods. <4> This shift implies that the 
(5) The average used hère is, of course, the arithmetic. A géométrie mean of relative 
changes, need not be zéro. 
(4) There can be strange perverse movements within firms and industries in short 
periods. 
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actual weighted average séries will tend to increase more than the individual 
wage rates themselves. 
There seems to be no simple way of measuring gênerai wage changes 
when the wage rates of the sub-groups as well as their relative sizes are 
changing, although under favourable circumstances some good approxima-
tions may be made. It may not be possible, then, with any précision, to se-
parate the individual changes from the gênerai changes in income. When 
it is possible, it may be noted that thèse éléments are simply additive in 
dollar terms. It is only in relative terms that there appears another term 
which Professor Marion suggests might be analogous to the « reaction » 
term in the analysis of variance. In support of Professor Marion's method 
it should be pointed out that many changes are expressed in relative terms. 
However, the « reaction » term may be interpreted as merely a hint of 
difficulties that can arise when changes are measured in relative terms. 
So much for the statistical questions. Professor Marion introduces 
some économie theory into the interprétation, and makes a serious error. 
He suggests that in using an index of productivity as a guide for wage 
changes, a downward adjustment be made to account for promotions and 
shiftings of labourers from job to job. His suggestion implies that there is 
no real contribution to productivity in thèse job changes. This is surely 
contrary to fact. When a new management takes over an enterprise to in-
crease its productivity, one of the first things it does is to shift the personnel 
around, taking labourers off of less productive jobs and putting them on 
more productive jobs. Less remunerative Unes of production are discon-
tinued in favour of more remunerative lines and workers are shifted ac-
cordingly. 
Similarly in the economy as a whole, when a labourer leaves a farm 
for a factory he is recognizing that society is valuing his productivity at the 
factory in higher real terms than his contribution on the farm. One may 
quarrel with the valuations which society puts on thèse things, but the cal-
culations of the G.N.P. take things as they are. 
When a man is promoted to a new job, the presumption is that he is 
selected because of his abilities to fulfill this more demanding job, with its 
greater responsibilities, need for more training or expérience, etc. The man 
will presumably be more productive in this new job and is paid more in 
récognition of the fact. 
It is true that some promotions and increases in salaries are given 
for other reasons. In top positions this can be a form of distributing Com-
pany profits. In lesser positions it may be a récognition of long service and 
loyalty. However, insofar as compétitive pressures prevail, the most suc-
cessful enterprises will be those who sélect for promotion on the basis 
of ability, and pay the market rates. Under such circumstances, there should 
be no adjustment such as Professor Marion suggests. 
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In personnel administration, job évaluation has long been practised 
to assure that wages are in fair relation to the requirements of the job, and 
Personal évaluation to fit men into appropriate jobs. <5> 
Situations can arise where the rigidities of Systems of évaluation must 
give way to outside market forces. <6> In the long run the fundamental ques-
tion is whether there are people to perform the job. The rules of supply 
and demand are the fundamental déterminants, so long as people are free 
to move (7) and questions of equity enter in two subsidiary ways : ( 1 ) In 
judging whether the supply of workers will be adéquate, one must evaluate 
the work and the conditions. But the equity that counts is the valuations 
by the workers themselves as to whether or not they will do that work for 
that wage. (2) The laws of supply and demand sometimes work slowly, 
and workers with very spécifie training and commitments are slow to move. 
The économie laws can be very cruel to those caught unprepared and 
through no fault of their own. Society must be prepared to assist when 
industry cannot do what is needed. This implies early pensions, re-training 
plans, moving allowances, etc. 
An interesting illustration is the case of the airline pilots who hâve 
built into their contracts some adjustment factors based on the speed of the 
planes, etc. Thus, when scientists and engineers build faster planes, and 
managers see that they are used properly, the pilots benefit even if the ca-
bins are better ventilated and more confortable and electronic devices make 
the controlling problems easier. 
Such indexes are, in a sensé, at two removes from fundamental prin-
cipes. If the speed of the plane is directly related to the difficulty of the 
work and the responsibility of the pilot so that his real work increases in 
proportion, then it has a strong claim for récognition. But even if this is true, 
the next question remains : Are there enough people wanting to do this 
job for this amount of pay ? If there are too many, then the pilots are creat-
ing a monopoly arrangement. On the other hand, if the skills required are 
so rare and the training needed is increasing so much that there is great 
difficulty in getting adéquate numbers of recruits, perhaps the pay should 
be increased even more rapidly. Alternatively, or in addition, more money 
might be put into recruitment and training. The fundamental question is 
then one of supply and demand. Questions of equity are related, but in a 
subsidiary position, from the point of view of the efficient use of resources 
in the economy. Of course, from the total view of society, reasons of equity 
are very important — indeed so important that there are times when we 
should give up a little efficiency for a little more equity. We should realize 
when we are making this trade-off. 
(5) See, for example, Paul Pigors and Charles A. Myers, Personnel Administration 
McGraw Hill. 
(6) Op. Cil, 5th ed, 1965, p . 487. 
(7) There are various kinds of restrictions on such movement, some of them justified 
for reasons of professional qualifications, etc., but many imposed mostly for mono-
polistic protection purposes. 
